A-Level Classical Civilisation · Politics of the Late Republic · Topic 8 · Revision
The Fifties: Breakdown
56–50 BC — Luca, Caesar in Gaul, Pompey's drift, and the Republic's failure to find a constitutional solution
The story
Conference of Luca (56 BC)
The triumvirate in crisis
by 56 BC the First Triumvirate was fraying: Pompey was drifting from Caesar, Cicero was beginning to reassert himself, and the Senate sensed an opportunity to divide the three men
Caesar summoned Pompey and Crassus to a summit at Luca (in Cisalpine Gaul, still technically Caesar's province) to renegotiate and strengthen the alliance
over 200 senators and most of the magistrates attended — the real government of Rome had relocated to a provincial town
The terms of the deal
Pompey and Crassus would seek the consulship for 55 BC, using bribery and intimidation to secure election
in return, Caesar's Gallic command would be extended for a further five years, giving him time to complete his conquests and accumulate the political capital he needed
after their consulship, Pompey would receive Spain and Crassus would receive Syria as proconsular provinces
the Senate was not consulted; the assemblies would merely ratify what had already been decided
Cicero's humiliation
Cicero, recently returned from exile and politically vulnerable, was made to cooperate; the triumvirs made clear that his safety depended on it
he defended Vatinius — a man he publicly despised — and spoke in favour of Caesar's Gallic command
in his letters he describes this compliance as a kind of political death
Cato attempted to resist but was outmanoeuvred; he stood for the praetorship of 55 BC and was defeated through bribery
Luca is one of the most revealing moments in the late Republic. Three private citizens — without constitutional authority — met and redistributed the Roman empire among themselves. The Senate, the assemblies, and the magistracies were irrelevant to actual power. Use this episode to support arguments that the Republic's structures had already been hollowed out well before the Rubicon crisis.
Exam focus
What does the Conference of Luca reveal about the state of Republican government in 56 BC?
How did Luca directly contribute to the conditions for civil war?
Why was Cicero's forced compliance at Luca politically significant?
The story
Cicero, Epistulae ad Familiares 2.4 (to Curio, 56 BC)
Context and significance
written in the immediate aftermath of the Conference of Luca, this letter to the young Marcus Scribonius Curio reveals Cicero at his most politically exposed
Cicero cannot openly criticise the triumvirate without risking a second exile, but he cannot endorse them without betraying his own principles
this is a prescribed source for this topic — know it closely
Studied neutrality
Cicero adopts a tone of philosophical detachment, as though the political situation is beneath his concern — this studied pose is itself a calculated political act
every sentence is designed to maintain relationships without committing to positions
the contrast with his earlier, more confident correspondence is sharp: before Luca, Cicero wrote as a political actor; after Luca, he writes as a survivor
Latin passageFam. 2.4
Ego me do huic rei totum, ut qui optime possit in his rebus versari.
"I give myself entirely to this matter, so that I may navigate these affairs as well as possible."
the verb versari (to move about, to conduct oneself) reveals Cicero's sense of politics as navigation rather than leadership — he is trying to survive, not to govern
the tone is active but the content is passive: "giving himself entirely" amounts to submitting to forces beyond his control
use this to show how the triumvirate silenced opposition without formal censorship
This letter is a primary document of political compromise under duress. The concept of "studied neutrality" is examiners' shorthand for Cicero's post-Luca voice: detached in tone, deeply compromised in reality. When using this letter as evidence, note that Cicero is writing to Curio (a younger man he wants to impress as well as inform) — the persona he projects is therefore partly performance.
Exam focus
What does Fam. 2.4 reveal about Cicero's political position after the Conference of Luca?
Explain the significance of the verb versari in the letter's key passage.
How does this letter demonstrate the triumvirate's control over senatorial opposition?
The story
Caesar in Gaul (58–50 BC)
Military achievement
between 58 and 50 BC Caesar conquered the whole of Gaul (modern France, Belgium, and parts of Germany and Switzerland)
he defeated the Helvetii, the Belgae, and the Veneti; crossed the Rhine twice; and invaded Britain twice
he claimed to have killed over a million people and enslaved another million — figures that, even if exaggerated, point to campaigns of extraordinary scale and savagery
Political dimension of the command
Caesar was building something unprecedented: veteran legions personally loyal to their commander rather than to the Roman state — paid, promoted, and enriched by Caesar personally
as long as Caesar held imperium, he could not be prosecuted; his enemies — above all Cato — had been waiting years to try him for alleged illegalities during his consulship of 59 BC
the Gallic command was therefore not merely a military posting but political survival
The De Bello Gallico as propaganda
Caesar published his account of the wars annually, ensuring Romans at home followed his campaigns in something close to real time
written in the third person to project objectivity, the De Bello Gallico presents Caesar as decisive, merciful, and indispensable
it is simultaneously a military report, a literary achievement, and a piece of political self-presentation
Caesar's Gallic command illustrates the Republic's central structural problem: it gave individuals sufficient power to become threats to the state itself. The imperium that protected Caesar from prosecution was the same imperium that would be used to justify crossing the Rubicon. The question is whether any constitutional system could have managed this tension, or whether Caesar exploited uniquely personal opportunities.
Exam focus
Why was Caesar's Gallic command politically, not just militarily, significant?
How does the De Bello Gallico serve Caesar's political interests as well as recording his campaigns?
What relationship existed between Caesar's imperium and his vulnerability to prosecution?
The story
Death of Crassus at Carrhae (53 BC)
The battle
Marcus Licinius Crassus, the richest man in Rome, sought military glory to match Pompey and Caesar; his province of Syria gave him access to the Parthian frontier
in 53 BC he launched an invasion of Parthia; at Carrhae (modern Harran in south-eastern Turkey), the Parthian horse archers destroyed his legions
Crassus was killed during negotiations; the Romans said the Parthians poured molten gold into his mouth as a comment on his legendary greed
Political consequences
Crassus had served as a structural counterweight in the triumvirate: his presence prevented the alliance from becoming a simple binary rivalry
with Crassus gone, Caesar and Pompey faced each other directly; the Republic had no mediating figure capable of brokering compromises
Julia's death in 54 BC (Caesar's daughter, Pompey's wife) had already severed the personal bond between the two men; Carrhae removed the structural one
Carrhae is frequently cited as a turning point, but it is worth asking whether it was decisive in itself or merely the latest step in an already deteriorating relationship. The structural counterweight argument is stronger than the personal one: even if Crassus had lived, the deepening rivalry between Caesar and Pompey might have consumed him anyway. Consider whether Luca (56 BC) or the SCU of January 49 BC was in fact the more significant hinge point.
Exam focus
Why is the death of Crassus considered a turning point in the relationship between Caesar and Pompey?
What role had Crassus played as a mediating force within the triumvirate?
Was Carrhae more significant than Luca as a cause of the civil war? Justify your view.
The story
Pompey and the Senate (54–52 BC)
The drift toward the boni
after Julia's death in 54 BC and Crassus's death in 53 BC, Pompey's personal and structural ties to Caesar dissolved
he began aligning with the boni — the conservative senatorial faction led by Cato, Bibulus, and others who saw Caesar as the primary threat to the Republic
this was an extraordinary transformation: Pompey had spent the 60s in conflict with the Senate; now he became its champion and protector
the Senate accepted Pompey as the lesser evil — better a powerful ally than a powerful enemy
Sole consulship (52 BC)
the murder of Clodius by Milo's gang in January 52 BC plunged Rome into chaos; Clodius's supporters burned the Senate house as a funeral pyre
normal political life was impossible; the year had begun without consuls because elections had been repeatedly disrupted by gang violence throughout 53 BC
the Senate appointed Pompey sole consul — unprecedented and technically unconstitutional, but a mark both of the Senate's desperation and Pompey's unique position
Pompey restored order efficiently; before the year ended he co-opted Metellus Scipio as a colleague, nominally restoring collegiality
The paradox of personal power
the sole consulship revealed the Republic's deepest contradiction: it had to break its own rules to maintain order
in appointing Pompey, the Senate legitimised the very principle of personal power that Caesar would use to destroy it
Pompey's legislation of 52 BC targeted electoral corruption and political violence — but also passed laws that directly threatened Caesar's position, including requirements for personal canvassing for office
Pompey's sole consulship is a powerful exhibit for structural-failure arguments. Note the irony: a sole consulship was functionally identical to a short-term dictatorship. The Senate invented an extraordinary, unconstitutional office to save constitutional government. This is the same logical pattern as the senatus consultum ultimum — the constitution suspending itself to survive. Use Pompey's alignment with the boni to show how personal and structural factors were inseparable by this point.
Exam focus
Explain why the Senate appointed Pompey sole consul in 52 BC.
What does Pompey's sole consulship reveal about the Republic's constitutional condition?
'Pompey was a defender of the Republic, not an ambitious dynast.' How far do you agree?
The story
Cato's continuing opposition
The Cyprus mission
in 58 BC, Clodius had arranged for Cato to be sent to annex Cyprus — a transparent attempt to remove him from Roman politics at a critical moment
Cato carried out the mission with characteristic efficiency and integrity, returning every coin to the treasury
the mission kept him away from Rome during the Luca period, limiting his ability to organise resistance
Constitutional obstruction
on his return, Cato insisted that Caesar must lay down his military command before standing for a second consulship
this was technically correct: the lex annalis required candidates to present themselves in person, without imperium — but it was also a trap, since returning to Rome as a private citizen meant immediate prosecution
Cato refused every compromise and every attempt to find a middle ground: for him, the law was the law, regardless of consequences
The problem of principle
Cato's position was logically correct but practically impossible without war: a constitution that can only be enforced through civil war is no longer functioning as a constitution
his inflexibility blocked the tribune Curio's compromise proposal (that both Caesar and Pompey disarm simultaneously), which commanded broad Senate support
the boni hardliners around Cato wanted unconditional surrender; this rigidity ensured that Caesar's only options were capitulation or war
Cato is central to any essay on individual versus structural causation. The question is whether his inflexibility caused the civil war or whether he was simply insisting on rules that any functioning republic would have to enforce. The strongest answers distinguish between moral correctness (Cato was right in principle) and political effectiveness (his principled stance, by foreclosing compromise, made war more likely). This is not the same as blaming him — it is recognising the tragic gap between principle and circumstance.
Exam focus
Was Cato's inflexibility a cause of the civil war, or was he simply enforcing the constitution?
What was the lex annalis, and why did Caesar's application to stand in absentia provoke a constitutional crisis?
How did Cato's blocking of Curio's compromise affect the path to war?
The story
Cicero, Epistulae ad Familiares 2.11 (to Caelius, c. 51 BC)
Context and significance
by 51 BC Cicero had been sent to govern the province of Cilicia (in modern southern Turkey) — a posting he neither wanted nor enjoyed
his letters to Marcus Caelius Rufus, a younger political ally who kept him informed of events in Rome, reveal a man torn between frustration and growing dread
this is a prescribed source for this topic — know it closely alongside Fam. 2.4
Tone and image
the tone is markedly different from Cicero's earlier correspondence: gone is the confident political operator of the 60s; in his place is an anxious, isolated figure who senses events moving beyond anyone's control
Cicero uses humour and irony to mask anxiety, but the underlying mood is one of helplessness
the letter reveals his awareness that the Republic's crisis is structural — that the outcome will be determined by military force, not political skill
Latin passageFam. 2.11
Quid sit futurum cras, fuge quaerere.
"What tomorrow will bring, do not ask."
the phrase captures Cicero's mood: a refusal to contemplate a future he cannot control
the imperative fuge (flee, avoid) implies active dread rather than mere uncertainty
use this alongside Fam. 2.4 to trace the arc of Cicero's decline from active politician to anxious observer across the decade
The two prescribed letters (Fam. 2.4 and 2.11) together illustrate a trajectory. In 2.4 (56 BC, after Luca), Cicero is constructing a careful public pose of neutrality — still engaged, still performing. In 2.11 (c. 51 BC), he is physically removed from Rome and politically marginalised. Together they show what the fifties did to the Republic's most articulate defender: from operator to spectator. When citing either letter, note the relationship between Cicero and his recipient, which shapes what he says and how.
Exam focus
What image of Cicero does Fam. 2.11 provide? Use specific details from the letter.
How does the tone of Fam. 2.11 differ from that of Fam. 2.4, and what does this tell us?
How reliable are Cicero's private letters as historical evidence for this period?
The story
The ultimatum and the Rubicon (50–49 BC)
The impasse
by late 50 BC the situation had become binary: the Senate, led by the boni, demanded Caesar disband his army and return as a private citizen before standing for a second consulship
Caesar knew that returning without his army meant prosecution, political destruction, and possibly death — his dignitas and his safety were the same question
Caesar offered a series of compromises: he would give up his command if Pompey gave up his; he would retain just two legions and Cisalpine Gaul until his consulship began; the tribune Curio proposed mutual simultaneous disarmament, which the Senate voted 370–22 to accept — before the boni overrode it
the boni rejected every offer; they wanted unconditional surrender
The SCU and the tribunes
in January 49 BC the Senate passed the senatus consultum ultimum — the emergency decree used against Gaius Gracchus, Saturninus, and the Catilinarians
Caesar's tribunes, Mark Antony and Curio, who had been vetoing anti-Caesar measures, were warned that their safety could not be guaranteed and fled Rome in disguise
this was a propaganda gift to Caesar: the Republic's most sacred institution, the tribunate, had been violated — the very principle Tiberius Gracchus had destroyed in 133 BC now weaponised against Caesar's enemies
The Rubicon
Alea iacta est.
"The die is cast."
Caesar crossed the Rubicon — the river marking the boundary between his province and Italy — under arms, committing an act of treason
Suetonius records his words as alea iacta est: the gambling metaphor frames his decision as a risk forced upon him by circumstances rather than naked aggression
the passive construction (iacta est) implies the die was cast by fate, not by Caesar — a masterpiece of self-exculpation
The ultimatum sequence is crucial for essays on inevitability. Caesar offered multiple compromises that were rejected. Was the Senate right to insist on unconditional compliance, or did Cato's rigidity make war inevitable? Note that Curio's compromise proposal was supported by 370 senators — an overwhelming majority — and was defeated only by boni hardliners. This suggests the war was not inevitable but was made so by specific political choices.
Exam focus
What compromises did Caesar offer in 50–49 BC, and why were they rejected?
How did the SCU and the expulsion of the tribunes serve Caesar's propaganda?
Analyse Caesar's use of the phrase alea iacta est as a rhetorical act.
The story
Significance: the Republic's structural failure (56–49 BC)
The failure of every institution
the tribunician veto was overridden when Antony and Curio were driven from Rome
senatorial authority was ignored: Caesar continued to negotiate on his own terms throughout 50 BC
negotiation was blocked by hardliners on both sides
the courts could not prosecute a man who commanded ten veteran legions
the assemblies were irrelevant: the real vote that mattered (Curio's 370–22 majority) was overturned by faction
the Republic's elaborate system of checks and balances, designed for a city-state governed by a relatively equal oligarchy, could not cope with the concentration of power that conquest had created
The structural diagnosis
the Republic had no constitutional mechanism for compelling an individual who was too powerful to be coerced by law
it could pass decrees but not enforce them without military force — and the military force belonged to Caesar
Pompey's sole consulship had already demonstrated that the Republic could not function through its normal institutions and needed a strongman; the question was only which strongman
Individual versus structural causation
Structural view (Syme): the Republic was already dead by the 50s; structural forces made civil war inevitable; individuals merely accelerated what could not be avoided
Individual view (Gruen): the Republic remained viable until very late; specific decisions by specific people — Cato's rigidity, Caesar's ambition, Pompey's indecisiveness — turned probability into reality
the strongest answers treat both as mutually reinforcing: the Republic's structures created opportunities for ambitious men, and ambitious men exploited those structures to their breaking point
In any essay on the fall of the Republic, the fifties should appear as the period when structural weakness and individual agency combined fatally. Connect the Conference of Luca (56 BC) backward to the Gracchi's precedents (popular legislation, SCU) and forward to the Rubicon. The decade shows the Republic not being destroyed in a single moment but progressively hollowed out until the shell collapsed. Gruen's argument that the Republic remained viable is most effectively challenged here: if the Senate majority supported Curio's compromise and were overridden, is "viable" the right word?
Exam focus
'The Republic's collapse was caused by structural failure, not individual ambition.' How far do you agree?
Which institution failed most completely during the 50s BC? Justify your answer.
Engage with Gruen's argument that the Republic remained viable until very late.
Sources
Caesar — De Bello Gallico
What it is
Caesar's account of his Gallic campaigns (58–50 BC), our most detailed source for this period — and also the most problematic
written in the third person to create an impression of objectivity: "Caesar did this," not "I did this"
simultaneously a military history, a literary masterpiece, and a sophisticated piece of political self-presentation — published annually to shape opinion in Rome as events unfolded
How Caesar constructs his image
Caesar presents himself as decisive, merciful, and strategically brilliant, always acting in Rome's interest
his enemies are either barbarian aggressors or treacherous rebels — never legitimate political adversaries
the reality was more complex: his campaigns involved significant provocation, and his treatment of conquered peoples could be savage (the massacre at the Usipetes and Tencteri drew criticism even in Rome)
Source assessment
Strengths: written by the commander himself with immediate knowledge; detailed, vivid, and internally consistent; the third-person style imposes a useful analytical discipline
Weaknesses: systematically self-serving; what Caesar omits is as significant as what he includes; no independent check for many episodes; the "objectivity" is a rhetorical construction
compare with Cicero's letters: Caesar polishes and presents; Cicero's correspondence shows the anxiety, calculation, and compromise that Caesar's elegant prose conceals
When using the De Bello Gallico, always foreground the source's purpose. The key analytical questions are: what self-image is Caesar constructing? What does he omit? How does the third-person voice create authority? The DBG is essential evidence, but it must be read against the grain — not as transparent reportage but as a political document whose silences are as revealing as its claims.
Exam focus
Assess the De Bello Gallico as a historical source for the politics of the 50s BC.
How does the third-person narrative style serve Caesar's political purposes?
What can we learn from the DBG that Caesar did not intend us to learn?
Sources
Cicero's Letters (56–50 BC)
What they are
Cicero's correspondence from this decade provides an invaluable counterpoint to Caesar's polished narrative — showing Roman politics from the inside
the prescribed letters are Fam. 2.4 (to Curio, on navigating post-Luca politics, 56 BC) and Fam. 2.11 (to Caelius, on frustration and detachment from Cilicia, c. 51 BC)
the extensive correspondence with Atticus supplements these: it traces Cicero's growing dread as civil war approaches and is more candid than the Fam. letters
Key passages
Fam. 2.4 — versari passage: Cicero gives himself entirely to "navigating" these affairs — survival language, not leadership language; captures his post-Luca compromise
Fam. 2.11 — fuge quaerere: "do not ask what tomorrow will bring" — active dread, helplessness in the face of events beyond his control
Att. 2.18 — rem publicam funditus amisimus: "we have lost the Republic entirely" — Cicero's starkest expression of ideological despair, essential for essays on his genuine commitment to Republican values
Source gaps & contradictions
Cicero writes to different correspondents with different agendas: his letters to Atticus (closest friend, safe confidant) are more candid than those to Caelius or Curio, who are political allies he also wants to impress
even "private" letters are literary performances — Cicero was aware they might circulate; scholarship by Shackleton Bailey and Steel emphasises that the image in each letter is shaped by the relationship between writer and recipient
we lack equivalent private correspondence from Caesar, Pompey, or Cato; the letters give us Cicero's perspective on events, not the events themselves
Cicero's letters are the Republic's most intimate surviving documents. Their value lies precisely in their partiality: they show one highly intelligent, deeply anxious man processing events in real time. The arc from Fam. 2.4 to Fam. 2.11 — from survival strategy to helpless dread — is itself historical evidence for what the fifties did to Republican politics. Use Shackleton Bailey's point about audience when evaluating reliability: the same event produces different letters depending on who Cicero is writing to.
Exam focus
How reliable are Cicero's letters as evidence for the politics of the 50s BC?
How does Cicero's tone change between Fam. 2.4 and Fam. 2.11, and what does this change reveal?
Why does it matter which correspondent Cicero is writing to when assessing his letters?
Exam
Was civil war inevitable by 50 BC?
The case: yes, it was inevitable
the Conference of Luca showed that three private citizens could redistribute provinces, consulships, and commands among themselves, rendering the Senate irrelevant to actual decision-making
Crassus's death at Carrhae (53 BC) removed the triangular balance; without a mediating figure, the alliance collapsed into a direct binary rivalry that Republican institutions could not resolve
both Caesar and Pompey commanded armies personally loyal to their commanders; any political dispute could — and did — be settled by military force
The case: no, it was not inevitable
negotiations continued until very late; as late as January 49 BC proposals and counter-proposals were still being exchanged, suggesting neither side regarded war as a foregone conclusion
the tribune Curio's compromise — that both Caesar and Pompey lay down their commands simultaneously — commanded a majority vote of 370–22 and was viable; it was blocked by boni hardliners, not by structural impossibility
the Senate could have granted Caesar's reasonable demands (standing in absentia, a reduced command) at minimal cost; its refusal was a choice, not a necessity
Key points to land
The Conference of Luca (56 BC): the real government of Rome was a private arrangement between three men with armies — the Senate's irrelevance was already structural
The SCU of January 49 BC: the same decree used against Gaius Gracchus and the Catilinarians, now used against Caesar's tribunes — trace the precedent back to 121 BC
Verdict (Gruen vs Syme): structural pressures made civil war highly probable after 56 BC — the concentration of military power, the collapse of mediating institutions, the personal stakes for both Caesar and Pompey. But structural pressures are not the same as inevitability. Specific decisions by specific individuals — Cato's refusal to compromise, the rejection of Curio's proposal, the passage of the SCU — were required to turn probability into reality. The fifties narrowed the range of possible outcomes; they did not eliminate alternatives. "Probable" is more accurate than "inevitable."
Exam focus
'Civil war was inevitable after 56 BC.' How far do you agree?
Distinguish between structural preconditions and triggering events in explaining the outbreak of civil war.
Exam
Essay questions — argument structures
10-mark sourceWhat image of Cicero does Fam. 2.11 provide?
Point 1 — Frustration and detachment: Cicero is geographically and emotionally removed from Rome, governing Cilicia against his will; he conveys deep frustration at being sidelined
Point 2 — Political helplessness: an ex-consul and Rome's greatest orator, he is powerless to influence events; the image is one of impotence
Point 3 — Loyalty to the Republic: his anxiety is not indifference — he cares deeply about what is unfolding; his identity is bound up with the health of the state
Point 4 — Self-awareness and wit: sardonic humour masks anxiety; the literary, reflective Cicero processes political events through writing
Point 5 — Source evaluation: a private letter to Caelius (a younger ally he wishes to impress); more candid than a public speech, but not without performance; compare with the more intimate letters to Atticus
Conclusion: the image is of a politically marginalised, anxious, but deeply principled man — not a coward, but a bystander against his will
10-markExplain the significance of the Conference of Luca (56 BC)
Point 1 — Renewal of the triumvirate: the fraying alliance was renegotiated and strengthened, demonstrating that the three men could still coordinate their power effectively
Point 2 — Division of power: a private carve-up of the Roman state — consulships, provinces, and commands distributed without reference to the Senate or assemblies
Point 3 — Senate bypassed: the most important political decisions were made in a provincial town by private citizens; a profound humiliation for senatorial authority
Point 4 — Cicero forced to submit: the most articulate voice of the Republic was silenced — his letters describe political death
Point 5 — Long-term consequences: Caesar's command was extended until 50 BC, giving him the army that would cross the Rubicon
Conclusion: significant as the moment when the Republic's institutional irrelevance was placed beyond doubt
10-markExplain why Pompey was given the sole consulship in 52 BC
Point 1 — Anarchy in Rome: Clodius's murder and the burning of the Senate house made normal politics impossible
Point 2 — No consuls in office: elections for 52 BC had been repeatedly disrupted; Rome had an unprecedented political vacuum
Point 3 — Pompey as strongman: only he had the military resources and political credibility to restore order; a sole consulship avoided the stigma of dictatorship
Point 4 — Cato's calculation: even Cato supported it as the lesser evil, designed to separate Pompey from Caesar and bind him to the Senate
Point 5 — Legislation against Caesar: Pompey's laws on canvassing and ratio absentis had direct implications for Caesar's position
Conclusion: granted to restore order but also to weaponise Pompey against Caesar — it confirmed the Republic's dependence on strongmen
20-mark'Pompey was a defender of the Republic, not an ambitious dynast.'
Agree: Pompey disbanded his armies after his Eastern campaigns (62 BC) and sought constitutional ratification through the Senate; he ultimately sided with the Senate against Caesar in 49 BC
Agree: his sole consulship included genuine reforms against corruption; he co-opted a colleague, respecting collegiality
Disagree: he sought repeated extraordinary commands (pirates, Mithridates, grain commission, sole consulship) that broke Republican precedent
Disagree: his "defence of the Republic" in 49 BC coincided with defending his own supremacy; Cicero's letters show frustration with Pompey's self-interest
Disagree: his retreat from Italy in 49 BC suggests he prioritised his own military position over Rome itself
Conclusion: both — he genuinely believed in the Republic but also wanted to be its dominant figure; his tragedy was that these goals became incompatible
30-mark'Civil war was inevitable after 56 BC.' How far do you agree?
Agree — Luca entrenched the power imbalance: three citizens distributed the Roman empire among themselves; the Senate was powerless
Agree — Deaths of Julia and Crassus removed the bonds: personal and structural mediating forces both gone by 53 BC
Agree — Structural crisis: the Republic had no constitutional mechanism for compelling a man who commanded ten legions
Disagree — Caesar offered compromises: multiple proposals rejected; the 370–22 Senate vote shows majority support for peace
Disagree — Pompey's indecisiveness left room for peace: a more decisive Pompey might have negotiated; this was contingent, not structural
Disagree — Cato's role was contingent: different individuals might have found a constitutional solution; war resulted from specific choices
Conclusion: structural conditions made civil war highly probable; specific decisions made it actual — "probable" is more defensible than "inevitable"
30-mark'Key players were motivated by ambition rather than ideals.' How far do you agree? (Discuss at least two.)
Caesar — Ambition dominant: relentless personal advancement from 59 BC consulship to perpetual dictatorship; crossed the Rubicon to protect his dignitas; De Bello Civili 1.7–9 frames war as defence of honour and tribunician rights
Caesar — Some ideals: genuine reforms (land redistribution, calendar, citizenship); clementia suggests he was not purely self-serving; the popularis tradition he inherited had genuine social content
Cicero — Ideals dominant:Att. 2.18 (rem publicam funditus amisimus) reveals genuine anguish; agonised decision-making in 49 BC; the arc from Fam. 2.4 to Fam. 2.11 shows ideological commitment, not mere self-interest
Cicero — Some ambition: constant reminders of his consulship and the Catilinarian affair; desire for a Cilician triumph; sensitivity to his novus homo status
Pompey — Ambition disguised as duty: always presented himself as the reluctant servant of the state while accumulating extraordinary powers; Seager's characterisation of enormous ambition with limited political vision
Conclusion: all three were motivated by both, in different proportions; Caesar's ambition increasingly overshadowed his ideals; Cicero's ideals were genuine but accompanied by vanity; Pompey's ambition was the most effectively disguised
Technique: at 30 marks, structure around an argument rather than a narrative. For the "inevitability" essay, open by defining "inevitable" and distinguishing structural preconditions from triggering decisions. For the "ambition vs ideals" essay, open by questioning the dichotomy — in Roman culture, personal dignitas and service to the state were intertwined, so the distinction is not as clear as the question implies. Anchor every point in specific evidence (Fam. 2.4, Fam. 2.11, Att. 2.18, De Bello Gallico, Curio's 370–22 vote) and engage with modern scholarship (Syme vs Gruen on structural vs individual causation; Seager on Pompey; Gelzer on Caesar's dignitas).
Flashcards
26 cards — click to flip, shuffle, or use ←/→ and Space