3.5 The Ideals of Cato the Younger

He dressed in plain, dark clothing — no purple-edged togas or expensive fabrics. He walked barefoot through Rome even in winter. He ate simple food and drank watered wine.

This wasn't poverty — Cato was wealthy. It was performance. Every aspect of his appearance announced: "I am not corrupted by luxury like these other senators."

Cato refused all bribes, gifts, or favours. He wouldn't accept loans (remember how Crassus used loans for influence in Topic 3.4?). He turned down profitable provincial governorships.

In an era where political careers were lubricated by money and patronage (Topic 1.3), Cato's refusal to participate made him stand out — but also made him ineffective at building coalitions.

Stoic virtue demanded that Cato never compromise, never negotiate, never bend. But Republican politics required compromise (remember amicitia from Topic 1.3?). By making moral absolutes of every political question, Cato made normal politics impossible. He couldn't distinguish between negotiable issues and fundamental principles.

Cato treated mos maiorum as if it were a detailed written law, but it wasn't. It was a vague collection of precedents that people interpreted differently. What Cato saw as "ancestral custom" often just meant "what benefits the Senate." His appeal to tradition was actually a conservative political programme dressed up as timeless principle.

Cato's appeal to mos maiorum was both genuine belief and political strategy. By positioning himself as tradition's defender, he made opposition to him seem like opposition to Rome itself. This rhetorical move gave him influence despite his unwillingness to compromise. But it also meant he couldn't distinguish between defending genuine Republican principles and defending senatorial privilege.

As quaestor, Cato managed Rome's treasury (aerarium). He immediately earned a reputation for financial honesty — rooting out corruption, demanding proper receipts, refusing to authorise irregular payments.

This made him respected but unpopular. Cato treated public money as sacred trust, not as a resource for political patronage. He was doing his job correctly — but in a system that ran on informal favours, "correct" wasn't always helpful.

This office is where Cato's inflexibility became politically significant — and we'll explore it in detail in the next section, because his opposition to Pompey in 62 BC was a crucial moment.

Cato argued that Pompey's eastern arrangements should be debated item by item in the Senate, not rubber-stamped as a package deal. Each treaty, each territorial change, each client king needed senatorial scrutiny.

Technically, Cato was correct — this was how mos maiorum said foreign policy should work. But it was also a deliberate obstruction designed to humiliate Pompey.

Cato saw Pompey as a threat to the Republic. If the Senate granted everything Pompey wanted without debate, it would confirm that military success gave commanders the right to dictate terms.

By forcing Pompey to negotiate, beg, and make concessions, Cato hoped to demonstrate that senators controlled policy, not generals.

Cato's obstruction worked — the Senate blocked Pompey's requests throughout 62-60 BC. Pompey, the most powerful man in Rome, couldn't get basic approval for arrangements made years earlier.

But this "victory" was disastrous. Pompey, frustrated and humiliated, became desperate for an alternative solution. By blocking normal channels, Cato forced Pompey towards extra-constitutional alliances — exactly what Cato was trying to prevent.

Cato's opposition to Pompey in 62 BC is the perfect example of principled inflexibility making problems worse. He was constitutionally correct but politically catastrophic. By refusing any compromise, he created the conditions for the very constitutional crisis he was trying to prevent. This demonstrates the Republic's fatal flaw: when the system depended on cooperation but powerful figures couldn't agree, deadlock led to extra-constitutional solutions.

Cato represents the Republic's conscience — but also its inability to adapt. His refusal to compromise embodied Republican ideals, yet his inflexibility accelerated the Republic's collapse. Was he noble or naive? Principled or impractical? The answer is: both.

What's Next in Topic 3?

You've now studied the major figures from 78-60 BC: Cicero (the opportunist orator), Pompey (the general who bent rules), Crassus (the wealthy patron), and Cato (the inflexible idealist).