3.4 Pompey and Crassus: Military Power in Politics

Pompey raised a private army at age 23 to support Sulla during the civil war (remember Topic 2.3?). This was ILLEGAL — only magistrates could command armies. But Sulla needed troops, so he accepted Pompey's help and gave him military commands despite his youth. Sulla's willingness to bend rules for effective commanders set a dangerous precedent.

Pompey's early career demonstrates how military success could substitute for traditional qualifications. He never held the praetorship or followed the cursus honorum properly, yet his military achievements made him politically indispensable. This pattern would be crucial for understanding Caesar's later rise.

Crassus weaponised patronage on an unprecedented scale. Remember from Topic 1.3 how patronage worked? Crassus took those traditional relationships and supercharged them with massive wealth:

When one of his legions broke and ran, he used decimation — executing 1 in 10 soldiers chosen by lot to terrify the rest into fighting.

He trapped Spartacus's army in southern Italy, defeated them in battle, and then crucified 6,000 captured slaves along the Appian Way from Rome to Capua — a 120-mile line of crosses as a warning.

Just as Crassus finished crushing the revolt, Pompey returned from Spain and killed a few thousand fleeing slaves. In his dispatch to Rome, Pompey claimed credit for "extirpating the war at its roots" — implying HE had finished what Crassus started. Crassus was FURIOUS. This insult created a personal rivalry that would define both their careers.

They didn't really have a choice. Both Pompey and Crassus had their armies camped outside Rome. The Senate's options were:

The Senate chose survival over principle.

The consulship of 70 BC is CRUCIAL because it shows the paradox of Pompey's career: he broke constitutional rules to get power, but then used that power to strengthen Republican institutions. This makes him harder to categorise than pure populares or optimates. Was he defending or destroying the Republic? Both, simultaneously.

Even though Pompey and Crassus governed well, the precedent was disastrous. If you could become consul without following the proper career path, what was the point of the cursus honorum? The message was clear: military success could override any constitutional requirement.

⏱️ Time: 10-15 minutes
Put Pompey and Crassus on trial for their illegal consulship. Were their constitutional violations justified by the circumstances and their achievements?

After hearing both sides: Which argument is more convincing? Were Pompey and Crassus defenders of the Republic (they saved Rome and governed well) or destroyers of it (they broke rules and set dangerous precedents)? Can they be both simultaneously?

Whilst Pompey was achieving military glory in the East (66-62 BC), his enemies at home were consolidating their positions. The Senate had four years to grow afraid of what Pompey might do with all that power, money, and military prestige. Success abroad meant vulnerability at home.

Their personal hatred created a political vacuum that the Republic couldn't resolve. By 60 BC, neither could dominate Rome alone, but they refused to work together permanently. This deadlock would require a solution — but that belongs to the next phase of the Late Republic.

This wasn't just personal dislike — it was a formal state of enmity that required public displays of opposition. Pompey couldn't support Crassus's initiatives without losing face, and vice versa. Their inimicitia was so deep that even when forced to cooperate as co-consuls in 70 BC, they could barely speak to each other.

At the end of their consulship, Pompey and Crassus publicly reconciled in the Forum. According to Plutarch, they shook hands in front of the assembled people, who cheered at this display of amicitia restored.

This fake reconciliation shows how Roman political relationships had become cynical performances rather than genuine bonds. The traditional system of amicitia and personal loyalty was breaking down.

The Pompey-Crassus inimicitia demonstrates how personal animosity could destabilise the entire political system. Traditional Roman politics relied on amicitia to build coalitions and resolve conflicts. When two powerful men were locked in permanent enmity, the system couldn't function. Neither could dominate alone, but they refused to cooperate. This deadlock made the Republic ungovernable — a problem that would need solving, though not yet covered in this topic.

⏱️ Time: 10-15 minutes
By 60 BC, the Republic faces an impossible situation. Work through the problem systematically to understand why this deadlock was so dangerous.

This deadlock is where Topic 3 ends. You've identified that the Republic faces an impossible situation: two powerful men who need each other but refuse to cooperate, whilst the Senate fears both. How this crisis was actually resolved belongs to Topic 4: The Collapse of Concordia. Keep your solutions in mind — we'll see which one (if any) actually happened.

Pompey and Crassus showed how military success and vast wealth could bypass traditional political institutions. Their methods — illegal consulships, extraordinary commands, forced alliances — became the new normal. Every precedent they set made the next ambitious commander's path easier.

By 60 BC, the Republic faced an impossible situation: Pompey couldn't get his settlements ratified, Crassus couldn't achieve military glory to match his wealth, and neither could dominate Rome alone. Their rivalry had created a political vacuum. How this deadlock was resolved belongs to Topic 4: The Collapse of Concordia.

What's Next in Topic 3?

You've covered how Pompey and Crassus accumulated power through military success and wealth (78-60 BC). Still to come in this topic:

Topic 4 will then cover 59-50 BC, including how the political deadlock of 60 BC was resolved and the consequences that followed.